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Abstract: Innovation activities in the German enterprise sector showed two opposing 
trends over the past two decades: While total innovation expenditures grew substan-
tially, the number of firms conducting innovation activities fell sharply. Innovation ex-
penditures hence concentrate on fewer firms. In this paper we analyse the evolution of 
firms’ innovation and R&D activities. Based on panel data from the German part of the 
Community Innovation Survey covering a 13 years period (2001 to 2013) we use con-
tinuous-time Markov-Chains to analyse the changing properties of the firms’ choices to 
conduct R&D and non-R&D innovation activities. Our findings are threefold. As com-
pared to the pre-crisis period 2001-2007 there is a considerable change in innovation 
and R&D behaviour of German firms from 2008 onwards with an increasing number of 
firms exiting R&D and innovation activities. Smaller firms are the main driver behind 
this process, particularly with regard to quitting non-R&D innovation activities. Al-
though smaller firms were also less likely to move to higher levels of innovativeness 
and R&D engagement and more likely to fall back in the pre-crisis period, these trends 
have been more pronounced in the crisis and even in the post-crisis period. Both public 
innovation support and better financial capabilities can increase the rate chances to 
move to higher levels of innovativeness and reduce the chances to fall back.  
JEL: O31, C22 
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1 Introduction 
Innovation expenditures in Germany have increased at an impressive rate in the course 
of the last two decades. Between 1995 and 2013, businesses in Germany raised their 
spending for developing and introducing new products and new processes from €60.8bn 
to €144.6bn giving a compound annual growth rate of 4.9% (Rammer et al. 2015). 
While these numbers suggest that German firms have become ever more focused on 
innovation, they hide the fact that this rise was mainly driven by large firms belonging 
to a few sectors. When we look at the above numbers by firm size we find that firms 
with less than 500 employees experienced only a very modest increase in their innova-
tion expenditures (€25.7bn in 1995 vs. €34.5bn in 2013, i.e. 1.6% per year) whereas 
large firms with more than 500 employees increased their spending from €35.1bn in 
1995 to €110.1bn in 2013 (6.6% per year). In line with these observations we also find a 
concentration of the activities on fewer firms. In particular, the share of innovators – 
firms that have introduced at least one product or process innovation during the preced-
ing three years – has similarly declined since the late 1990s. Having reached a peak in 
1999 at 55.5%, it dropped to 43.7% in 2007 and further declined to 37.1% in 2013.1 
A look at the sector distribution conveys a similar concentration. In 1995, the R&D in-
tensive manufacturing sectors (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electronics, machinery & 
equipment, vehicles) spent €30.9bn on innovation and increased that figure to €92.6bn 
in 2013 (+6.3% per year). Low-tech manufacturing and service sectors expanded their 
innovation expenditure by an average annual rate of 3.1% 
                                                 
1  A similar decline in the innovation share is also found in other European countries, though changes 
in survey methodologies and the lack of annual surveys limit long-term comparisons. For 12 Euro-
pean countries reporting innovation data for all Community Innovation Surveys from 1996 to 2012, 
the share of innovators fell from 45% in 1996 to 40% in 2006 and went further down to 37% in 
2012. 
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These developments would not be problematic if they were due to firms from high-tech 
sectors growing at an above-average rate. While some well-known examples of this 
phenomenon also exist in Germany, e.g. the software company SAP, the absolute num-
bers of such cases is very limited. Moreover, the share of value added share of highly 
R&D-intensive sectors remained fairly stable in Germany. This makes this explanation 
implausible.  
In this article we argue that the phenomenon is more likely to be explained by smaller 
firms withdrawing from innovation activities at a large scale. Such a development 
would be of much greater concern because one of the pillars of the competitiveness of 
the German economy is seen in its highly innovative SMEs. A withdrawal of these 
firms from innovation would make the German economy considerably more reliant on 
set of well-known large companies, while grassroot innovation in SMEs may be lost. 
Moreover, since choices about innovation activities display a high degree of path de-
pendence, these developments may easily turn permanent. 
While the aggregate figures from above indeed provide initial evidence of SMEs with-
drawing from innovation, such aggregate indicators can be misleading when processes 
simultaneously taking place are left unaccounted. More convincing evidence must 
therefore rely on firm level evidence using methods that can appropriately account for 
confounding factors. Relying on a panel of all firms that took part in the annual German 
Innovation Surveys covering the period from 2001 to 2013 we employ Markov Chain 
methods that model when and why firms change their innovative both in terms of actual 
innovation outcomes as well as in terms of R&D effort.  
The main are results are threefold. By dividing our data into two periods from 2001-
2007 and 2008-2013, we show that the long-term share of firms engaging in innovation 
and R&D is considerably lower in the second period with an increase of the share of 
firms not innovative at all. Second, analyses of the determinants suggest that, as ex-
pected, smaller firms are more likely to quit innovation activities. We show that they are 
less likely switch to higher levels of innovative activities (e.g. from non-innovative to 
product or process innovator or from product or process innovator to simultaneous 
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product and process innovator). They are also more likely to fall back to lower levels of 
innovativeness. Most importantly this pattern is becoming more pronounced in the later 
period of 2008 and after. Furthermore, we show that our findings are not a transitory 
short term shock of the economic crisis, because the declining trend persists even in 
2011 and 2013, which were years of considerable economic growth in Germany. Thus, 
there seems a risk that these developments become persistent. We therefore analyse the 
effectiveness of a set of mechanisms potentially offsetting or at least slowing down 
these developments. We show that both public innovation support and better financial 
capabilities increase the chances to move to higher levels of innovativeness and reduce 
the probability to fall back. We conclude that strengthening public innovation support in 
in Germany should be a primary target of economic policy to avoid the risk of a perma-
nent withdrawal of German SMEs from innovation.  
2 Background – persistence of innovation activities and its rela-
tion to firm size 
Empirical accounts of firms’ innovation activities usually indicate the existence of a 
core of systematically iinnovating firms surrounded by a larger number of firms con-
ducting either no or only very sporadic innovation activities (Bottazzi et al. 2001, Cefis 
2003, Malerba and Orsenigo 1997). Transition rates between the groups of innovation 
active and inactive firms are usually very low, which implies persistent heterogeneity of 
R&D strategies across firms (Dosi 2007, see Crespi and Scelatto, 2015 and Latham and 
Le Bas, 2006 for an overview). 
This persistence has often been explained with the reference to cumulative development 
of organizational routines driving innovation-relevant capabilitities (Nelson and Winter 
1982; Teece et al. 1997). More precisely, a point is made that past innovation activities 
increase the effectiveness of future innovation activities making choices about innova-
tion (or its absence) persistent and path dependent (see Nelson and Winter 1982). This 
persistence results on the one hand from the fact that by conducting innovation in the 
past, firms learn to manage innovation more effectively in the future. On the other hand, 
a firm’s knowledge stock strongly determines its absorptive capacity and eases the ac-
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quisition of external knowledge, which provides another stimulus for innovation (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990). In this respect, innovation is subject to increasing returns to scale 
(‘success breeds success’, see Phillips 1971 and Mansfield 1968). 
Persistence may also as a result of sunk costs (Peters 2009; Le Bas and Scelatto 2014).  
or if the factors driving a firm’s decision to innovate or not are persistent over time. 
Market structure may be such a factor, i.e. firms acting in a highly competitive envi-
ronment that demands regular innovative advance will tend to innovate continuously 
(see Schmookler 1966 for theoretical arguments and Malerba et al. 1997; Peters 2009; 
Woerter 2014 for empirical evidence). 
In general, the theoretical predictions on the persistence of innovation activities have 
been corroborated by the empirical literature relying on a variety of different data 
sources.2  
Máñez Castillejo et al. (2009, 2014) analysed persistency in R&D for Spanish manufac-
turing firms and found that past R&D experience positively affected the decision to 
conduct R&D, though the effect of prior R&D experience depreciates fairly quickly 
over time. Persistence seems to be driven both by sunk costs, success-breeds-success 
and demand-pull. Baraldi et al. (2013) find that persistence in R&D depends on the 
market structure as only firms in oligopolistic markets (Schumpeter I industries) show 
persistent R&D efforts. Woerter (2014) supports this finding based on Swiss data since 
persistence in R&D expenditures is more likely for firms with few competitors.  
Several studies use innovation survey data. They tend to focus on the output of innova-
tive efforts, i.e. the introduction of new products and new processes, and the direct eco-
                                                 
2  It should be noted however that studies using patent application data often found lower levels of 
persistence (Geroski et al. 1997; Cefis and Orsenigo 2001; Cefis 2003; Malerba and Orsenigo 1999). 
Although, Malerba et al. (1997) and Alfranca et al. (2002) find more evidence for persistence, par-
ticularly among larger firms and when looking at specific fields of technology, Duguet and Monjon 
(2004) conclude that persistency in patenting rather reveals persistency in technological leadership 
than in the decision to innovate. 
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nomic outcome in terms of new product sales. These variables are generally found to be 
positively correlated over time (for Finland see Deschryvere 2014; for France see 
Duguet and Monjon 2004; Haned et al. 2014; Lhuillery 2014; for Germany see Peters 
2009; Ganter and Hecker 2013; Hecker and Ganter 2014; for Luxembourg see Le Bas et 
al., 2015; Le Bas and Poussing 2014; for the Netherlands see Raymond et al. 2010; for 
Norway see Clausen 2012; Clausen and Pohjola 2013; for Sweden see Karlsson and 
Tavassoli 2015; Johansson and Lööf 2010; for the UK see Preverzer and Frenz 2013).  
Another important data source is a panel survey of Spanish manufacturing firms con-
taining information on innovation (see Máñez 2009, 2014; Martínez-Ros and Labeaga 
2009; Triguero et al. 2014a,b; Triguero and Córcoles 2013). A few other authors use 
case study approaches (Matvejeva 2014), sometimes combined with firm survey data 
(Roper and Hewitt-Dundas 2008). Empirical studies for non-European countries are less 
frequent (see Huang 2008; Huang and Yang 2010; Jang and Chen 2011 for Taiwan; 
Rogers 2004 for Australia; Suárez 2014 for Argentina). 
Accrodingly, the literature survey by Crespi and Scellato (2015) strongly supports the 
finding of persistency. Beyond that several studies show that the degree of persistence 
may depend on firm size.  
This is because the well-documented increasing returns to scale in innovation (see 
Clausen and Pohjola 2013; Lhuillery 2014; Máñez et al. 2014; Raymond et al. 2010; 
Flaig and Stadler 1994) may be more pronounced for larger firms. In particular, because 
larger firms often possess complementary assets (Teece 1986) and follow more elabo-
rated protection strategies of intellectual property (Neuhäusler 2012) necessary for pri-
vatizing the benefits of innovation, they are often more successful with their innovation 
activities.  
This likely induces them to continuing their innovation activities. Empirical evidence of 
larger firms showing higher persistence is provided by Roper and Hewitt-Dundas 
(2008) and Antonelli et al. (2013). Also, larger firms follow more complex innovation 
strategies and more complex innovators are less likely to discontinue innovation (Le 
Bas and Poussing 2014). 
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This suggests that any events potentially changing the firms’ innovation behaviours 
(e.g. changes in the access to financing or demand side factors) are more likely to lead 
to changes in observed behaviour of small rather than large firms. While we do not en-
deavour to explain the reasons for the trend towards a concentration of innovation and 
R&D activities on a few firms, this also means that the concentration may be mainly 
driven by a withdrawal of smaller firms. Based on this, our first aim is to corroborate 
the already described trend of declining overall R&D and innovation engagement in a 
setting controlling for various confounding factors, such as potential shifts in the sec-
toral composition. By this we intend to show that there was probably some change in 
the overall firms’ innovation behaviour going on. Our second aim is to show that this 
trend was primarily driven by a withdrawal of small to medium-sized firms. Third, we 
aim to contribute to a better understanding of the options policy has to counteract a fur-
ther concentration of innovation and R&D on predominantly large firms. For this end 
we investigate the impact of specific firm characteristics on their likelihood to continue 
or discontinue innovation and R&D. We start with the influence of public innovation 
subsidies as prime measure to increase and support firms’ innovation and R&D activi-
ties. Because the public innovation support is usually justified by either strengthening 
the ability to finance innovation or by bringing together complementary resources 
through innovation collaboration we also analyse the influence innovation collaboration 
and financial strength on the likelihood to continue or discontinue innovation and R&D 
activities. 
We now continue with a description of the underlying dataset and some more descrip-
tive details on the dynamics of the R&D and innovation engagement of German firms 
during the last 15-20 years. 
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3 Data  
The Mannheim Innovation Panel 
Our study uses data from the German Innovation Survey which is part of the CIS initia-
tive. In contrast to most other national CIS, the German Innovation Survey is an annual 
survey based on a panel sample. It is conducted by the Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW) on behalf of the Federal government. As ZEW is located in the city of 
Mannheim, this panel survey is called the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP). The MIP 
applies the common methodology of the CIS in terms of sampling, questionnaire and 
data quality control. It goes beyond the minimum requirements of the CIS in terms of 
size and sector coverage as it also includes very small firms (below 10 employees) and 
covers more service sectors than the core CIS service sector definition would require. 
The MIP questionnaire contains a number of additional questions not being part of the 
harmonised questionnaire of the CIS, including financial information and more detailed 
information on innovation processes and determinants, hence enlarging the analytical 
potential at the expense of imposing a higher response burden on the firms. 
The MIP sample is a panel sample which was drawn in 1993 (for manufacturing) and 
1995 (for services) and has been updated since every second year in order to compen-
sate for panel mortality. While the sampling frame is the official business register, the 
register is not accessible for drawing a sample. Instead, the firm data base of Creditre-
form, Germany’s largest credit rating agency, is used. This data base includes all eco-
nomically active enterprises in Germany and hence includes the same firm population as 
the business register. An advantage of using Creditreform’s data base for sampling is 
the opportunity to add further information to the data, including the credit rating of each 
firm. We use this opportunity in the present paper.  
Rammer and Peters (2013) provide a comprehensive overview of this survey and its 
panel structure, including a discussion of the persistence of innovative activities. The 
current sample size is around 35,000. As the MIP is a voluntary survey, and owing to 
the high response burden due to the lengthy questionnaire, response rates are compara-
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bly low at 25 to 35%. The panel consists of 5,000 to 8,000 firm observations per year 
based on questionnaire responses. In addition, a large-scale non-response survey of a 
similar size is conducted every year to control for a likely response bias with respect to 
R&D activity and the introduction of product and process innovation. The non-response 
survey is conducted through a telephone interview, using exactly the same definitions 
and questions as used in the questionnaire. For this paper, we use both the R&D and 
innovation information from the questionnaire and the non-response interviews.  
Descriptive Statistics on Firms Conducting R&D and Innovation Activities 
For this paper, we use data for the period 2001 to 2013. We start in 2001 for methodo-
logical reasons since the question on product and process innovation has been re-
designed in that year, causing a break in data (with a higher share of firms reporting 
both product and process innovation prior to the re-design). Within the 13 year period 
covered in this study, a total of 49,557 different firms have been part of the sample. 
42,247 firms responded at least one time. 36.8% of the firms where part of the sample at 
the beginning of the period (and hence have the chance to appear in every single year of 
the period under cover) while the others entered the sample in later years (between 8 
and 12% for each of the reference years in which the panel sample had been refreshed: 
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012). The total number of responses by the 42,247 
firms is 153,224, giving an average number of responses per firm of 3.6. As usual in 
voluntary firm panel surveys with high panel mortality, the panel is strongly unbal-
anced. Only 0.7% of the firms in our sample responded in each of the 13 years, produc-
ing 2.5% of all firm-year observations. 30% of the firms responded at least 5 times dur-
ing the period 2001-2013, producing 62% of all observations. Table 1 provides details 
on the panel structure of our sample. 
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Table 1: Number of firms and firm-year observations differentiated by the number of 
panel participations during 2001 and 2013 
No. of panel 
participations  
No. of firms Share in all 
firms (%) 
No. of firm-year 
observations 
Share in all 
observations (%) 
1 13,300 31.5 13,300 8.7 
2 7,541 17.8 15,082 9.8 
3 4,961 11.7 14,883 9.7 
4 3,764 8.9 15,056 9.8 
5 2,738 6.5 13,690 8.9 
6 2,481 5.9 14,886 9.7 
7 2,129 5.0 14,903 9.7 
8 1,609 3.8 12,872 8.4 
9 1,274 3.0 11,466 7.5 
10 975 2.3 9,750 6.4 
11 657 1.6 7,227 4.7 
12 525 1.2 6,300 4.1 
13 293 0.7 3,809 2.5 
Total 42,247 100.0 153,224 100.0 
Table 2 gives some descriptive results on the persistence of R&D and innovation activi-
ties. Following the standard measurement of in-house R&D activities in the CIS, we 
distinguish continuous, occasional and no R&D. Innovation activities are separated by 
product and process innovation. When calculating the share of firms that reports the 
same R&D or innovation status in each year of survey participation, we see that the 
share falling with the number of participations up to about 8 participations. For firms 
with very frequent responses to the survey, this share does not vary significantly. 
Among the firms participating in each of the 13 years covered by this study, 39% re-
ported the same status in terms of product innovation (i.e. either no product innovation 
in each year, or product innovation in every single year) and 36% reported the same 
status in terms of process innovation. For continuous R&D, the share of firms with per-
sistent activities is much higher (66% reporting either continuous R&D activities in 
every single year, or never had continuous R&D activities in any of the 13 years) as is 
the share of firms with respect to occasional R&D (57%) and no R&D (56%). One 
should note that the persistence of R&D and innovation activities in CIS-type surveys 
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will be overrated owing to the fact that both R&D and innovation activities reported in a 
certain survey year should theoretically refer to activities in the previous three year pe-
riod. In practice, many firms do not seem to follow these instructions but rather report 
activities for the reference year only. This finding is supported both by cognitive testing 
of CIS survey questions, face-to-face interviews with enterprises participating in the 
survey and panel survey results that show responses inconsistent with the three year 
reference period (see Rammer and Peters, 2013, for more details). 
Table 2: Persistence of R&D and innovation activities differentiated by the number of 
panel participations during 2001 and 2013 
Share of firms not changing their status with respect to ... No. of panel 
participations 
during 2001 and 
2013 
product  
innovation 
process 
innovation 
continuous 
R&D 
occasional 
R&D 
no R&D 
1 100 100 100 100 100 
2 75 72 87 84 83 
3 62 57 74 71 72 
4 53 48 69 63 62 
5 46 38 64 56 54 
6 44 36 61 54 52 
7 41 34 59 52 53 
8 36 28 57 48 47 
9 39 28 57 47 47 
10 37 29 57 47 50 
11 35 25 54 43 48 
12 38 29 59 51 52 
13 39 36 66 57 56 
When calculating the share of firms with R&D and innovation activities over the 13-
year period using sample weights (corrected for a likely non-response bias, see Asch-
hoff et al., 2013, for more details), one can observe a distinct downward trend for the 
share of firms having introduced product or process innovation, going down from 52% 
in 2001 to 37% in 2013. For continuous R&D we find much smaller decrease (from 
14% to 12%). The share of firms with occasional R&D is fluctuating somewhat stronger 
but also shows a downward trend (from 10% to 8%). When expanding the observation 
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period back to the mid 1990s, the decrease in the share of innovating firms becomes 
even more salient while the share of firms with continuous or occasional R&D was 
lower in the mid 1990s than in 2013.  
The falling share of firms with R&D and innovation activities is sharply contrasted by a 
strong and almost steady increase in total innovation expenditure in the German enter-
prise sector over the past two decades. Though the data are nominal values, the average 
annual rate of growth rate of 4.0% (2001-2013) indicates a strong real growth of inno-
vation budgets. Broken down by size classes one clearly sees that large enterprises were 
mainly responsible for that increase (4.9% average annual growth) while small and me-
dium-sized firms have expanded their innovation expenditure at an annual rate of 1.8% 
only. These two opposing trends motivate our empirical study.  
Figure 1: Innovation and R&D activities, and innovation expenditure in the German 
business enterprise sector, 1995-2013 
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4 Methodology 
An Introduction to Markov Chains 
In order to analyse our main research questions (see Section 2) we make use of a set of 
econometric Maximum Likelihood estimators that belong to the class of Markov Chain 
Models. Markov Chains are so called state-space models, which describe how observed 
units move between a fixed (though possibly large) set of discrete states. Focusing on 
the innovation state, on the input side we will distinguish between different states of 
R&D engagement - specifically “no R&D”, “occasional R&D” and “continuous R&D”. 
On the output-side we will consider three states of innovation engagement: “no innova-
tions”, “product or process innovations”, and “product and process innovations”.  
To facilitate the exposition of the methodology, we refer to the R&D model in the fol-
lowing. The three states constitute the state space. As we have panel data at hand, we 
can construct two pieces of information. The first is the so-called starting vector3 
 0 10 20 30p p p p   (1) 
which simply contains the probabilities in the starting period that a firm was in state 1 
(e.g not R&D active), state 2 (occasionally R&D performing) or in state 3 (continuously 
R&D performing), where each firm must be in exactly one state.  
The second piece of information that can be gathered from the panel data is on how 
firms move between the states over time. This information is usually represented in the 
                                                 
3  Technically we will use a somewhat more complicated model than the one described above in two 
respects. First we allow for time to pass continuously and second we allow the transition probabili-
ties to depend on firm-specific covariates in all our analyses. But to facilitate the presentation of the 
methodology we will continue with the time-discrete model because it is easier to understand while 
the general mechanics are identical. We also defer the discussion of the firm specific covariates even 
though they are already used as controls in predicting the stationary distributions, which we now 
turn to. 
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transition matrix which contains in each cell ( , j)i  the probability that a firm moves 
from state i to state j. With three states it looks as follows: 
11 12 13
21 22 23
31 32 33
q q q
P q q q
q q q
      
 (2) 
The diagonal elements will then obviously indicate the probabilities that a firm will re-
main in the current state indicating the degree of persistence. In the transition matrix all 
rows must sum to one, since each firm attached to one particular state must either stay 
there or move to one of the other states. Furthermore it is worth noting that panel data 
allows estimating the transition matrix by calculating the shares in which a firms from 
each state i transited to any of the states j.  
Markov Chains can be used for a variety of purposes. For example Tavassoli and Karls-
son (2015) calculate Eq. (2) for different combinations of innovations and argue for 
heavy persistence in firms’ innovation behaviour based on the observation that the di-
agonal probabilities are much larger than the off-diagonal probabilities.   
Further, under the Markov assumption that the current state of the system is only deter-
mined by its directly preceding states, Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) can also be used for prediction 
.In particular, the k-periods-ahead prediction at time t is simply: 
k
t k tp p P     (3) 
Predicting Stationary Distributions 
Eq. (3) is particularly interesting because it allows an assessment of the future distribu-
tions of firms between the different innovation and R&D engagement classes. In par-
ticular, it can be shown that under certain conditions4 the future distribution in Eq. (3) 
                                                 
4  We will not state these properties here but they are true in our application.  
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converges to a constant limit. This is called the stationarity property and states that the 
long-run distribution does not depend on the starting vector. It can be shown that the 
stationary distribution for three states is determined by the following formula: 
1'
11 12 13
21 22 23
31 32 33
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1
q q q
p q q q
q q q
                                    
  (5) 
In principle we use this formula in Section 5 when we calculate the stationary distribu-
tions to evaluate whether the innovation behaviour of German firms has changed over 
time. In particular, we will compare the stationary distributions implied in the before 
crisis period (2001-2007) in the crises period (2008-2010) and the post crisis period 
(2011-2013).5 
Firm-specific Transition Probabilities 
Our second aim is to assess whether small and medium-sized firms are responsible for 
the decline in the observed innovator and R&D-performer rates. Our third aim is to ana-
lyse, whether the fact that a firm received public funding, was involved in innovation 
collaborations, or was financially restricted has any consequences on the decision to 
move in or out of innovation and R&D. To analyse these questions we have to allow the 
probabilities in Eq. (2) to depend on firm characteristics.  A convenient functional form 
is the hazard rate specification also used in other survival models: 
( ) e ht ijxbij ht ijq x q
   (6) 
                                                 
5  As indicated we have actually used estimates of the transition matrix that are based on size and sec-
tor controls. We evaluate the stationary distributions for the mean of the control variables. Since the 
means are calculated over the whole sample period, the results are more robust to changes in the 
sample composition than to use unconditional models. 
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where i and j denote states as before, h indicates a firm, and t the time period. bijq  is a 
baseline hazard of moving from i to j, which is modified according to an exponential 
function that depends on firm characteristics htx  and parameters ij . While maximiza-
tion occurs over the baseline hazard and the parameter ij , it should be noted that the 
main interest is on the latter, since they indicate whether the actual transition probability 
for a firm with particular characteristics is below or above the baseline hazard. In Sec-
tion 5 we will therefore report the hazard rate which represents the percentage increase 
or decline of the baseline hazard due to a marginal increase of the explanatory variables. 
For all estimations we have used the msm-package for R, which was provided by Jack-
son (2011).  
Main Variables 
Markov Chains in its easiest form only need information on the state space and how 
units change between states. Thus the most important variables are those that define the 
state space. As indicated before we use a variable for innovation input (conducting 
R&D activities) and innovation output (having introduced a product or process innova-
tion).  
As concerns the R&D variable, firms are asked to report whether they perform R&D on 
an occasionally or on a continuous basis or whether they do not have in-house R&D 
activities. These three answers determine the three states that firms may move between. 
With respect to the innovation output there is information on whether firms have intro-
duce no innovation in the last three years, whether they introduced product innovations 
or whether they introduced process innovations. From these answers we construct a 
three state variable, which is zero if the firm was not an innovator. It is equal to 1, if the 
firm introduced either product or process innovations, and equal to 2, if it introduced 
product or process innovations simultaneously. This definition was chosen because the 
states 1, 2, and 3 can be though of as reflecting increasing engagement in innovation 
and R&D, with 1 indicating no engagement, 2 indicating intermediate engagement, and 
3 high engagement. 
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The second set of variables consists of those that are used to allow for firm-specific dif-
ferences in the transition probabilities. In order to control for sector differences we use 
the OECD tech-level classification to differentiate between medium- high-tech sectors, 
medium-low-tech sectors, and services. We will refrain from interpreting these variables 
as they are merely treated as potential confounders. More interesting are the variables 
on size of the firm as we have discussed that smaller firms might be more at the core of 
a potential reduction in the share of firms engaged in innovation and R&D. In order to 
investigate how the baseline hazard is affected by size of the firm we include a dummy 
for small and medium sized companies (1-499 employees).6 The baseline category con-
sists of firms with more than 500 employees. Finally we include a set of variables that 
are commonly discussed as promoters of innovation. One variable measures whether the 
firm received public support for R&D or innovation by any public funding body inside 
or outside Germany (State governments and Federal government in Germany, EU, other 
national or international sources). The second is equal to 1 if the firm was active in in-
novation partnerships to analyse the importance of the social framing and bidirectional 
knowledge flows between firms. The third measure is a measure of the firm’s financial 
strength. We use the credit rating index of Creditreform. The index is a continuous vari-
able takes the value of 1 for firms with the best rating and 4 with the lowest. Firms in 
the state of insolvency or bankruptcy get index values 5 or 6. We invert this measure in 
order to let larger values denote a better credit rating in order to facilitate interpretation 
of the coefficients. 
                                                 
6  We further differentiate between firms that have below 50 employees, those that have between 50 
and 249, and those that have 250 and 499. Technically it would have been possible to include a con-
tinuous measure of size (e.g. number of employees) with this would have hidden any differences be-
tween the classes of the firm. 
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5 Results 
Stationary Distributions of R&D and Innovation Activities 
Going beyond the descriptive accounts of the aggregated share of firms conducting in-
novation and R&D activities, in this section we are particularly interested predicting the 
long-term evolution of distribution of the firms between the different innovation and 
R&D states in the long-run. This generalises the descriptive findings of the aggregate 
data (Section 3) in one important respect. In particular, investigating actual shares only 
gives information on the contemporary distribution. Analysing stationary distributions 
implied by actual transition rates gives information on the long-run distribution. Thus 
the analysis becomes forward-looking.  
We intend to show that the transition matrices in earlier sub-periods of dataset implied 
stationary distributions with higher innovation and R&D engagement than in later peri-
ods. For this end we subdivide our dataset in a pre-crisis period ranging from 2001-
2007, a crisis-period from 2008-2010 and a post-crisis period from 2011 to 2013. Dif-
ferentiating between a crisis and post-crisis period is primarily done to ensure that the 
declining trends are not only driven by short-term transitory shock of the economic cri-
sis in 2008-2010. Instead by showing that the trends also extend to the period 2011-
2013 characterised by a positive economic climate, we intend to demonstrate that the 
concentration trend is permanent and unlikely a pure business cycle effect. The results 
can be found in Figure 2. 
Looking at the left panel we observe a clear pattern, which can be described by a con-
tinuous increase in the share of non-R&D active firms over the three periods, a slightly 
decreasing share of firms that occasionally conduct R&D, and a strongly contracting 
share of firms that continuously do so. This effect is not negligible. While the stationary 
share of continuous R&D performers was still about 28% in 2001-2007, this share drops 
19% in 2011-2013. This corresponds to a relative decline of almost one third. As con-
cerns occasional R&D the drop is more modest (from 15% to slightly below 14%). Be-
cause each firm must be in exactly one state, corresponding to the reduction of the 
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shares of R&D active firms we observe an increase of the non-R&D active firms from 
57% in the pre-crisis period to 67% in the post-crisis period.  
A point of great concern is that these changes cannot easily be interpreted as a crisis-
induced pro-cyclical phenomenon because instead of returning to the pre-crisis distribu-
tion also in the period 2011-2013 (a period of economic prosperity in Germany) the 
negative trends seem to amplify even after the crisis.  
Figure 2: The stationary distributions of the share of firms conducing R&D (top panel) 
and innovation (bottom panel) in pre-crisis and post-crisis periods 
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The results for introducing product and process innovations are similar, albeit a little bit 
less drastic. The share of simultaneous product and process innovators drops from 15% 
to 10%, which again corresponds to 33% relative decrease. The share of product or 
process innovators stays with about 18% roughly constant, while the non-innovators 
increase from 67% to 72%. In one important respect these results differ from changes in 
the stationary R&D distributions. In particular, while the negative trend intensified for 
R&D, there seems a slight trend back towards the pre-crisis values for innovation par-
ticipation at least for the stationary shares of non-innovating firms and product or proc-
ess innovators.  
In summary, we make two important observations. First, firms in Germany retract both 
in terms of innovativeness and in terms of R&D participation. This corroborates the 
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findings from aggregate descriptive accounts also in a setting where a number of control 
variables (e.g. sector composition or size) are included. Thus, there is evidence against 
the argument that changing industry structures or firm growth of particularly innovative 
firms can completely explain the concentration trends. Second, given that both for R&D 
and innovation the trends are not reversed after the crisis – there is even intensification 
for R&D – the transience of these trends can be doubted implying that business cycle 
events are unlikely to be the main cause. This suggests that a change in the behaviour of 
firms than a change in the composition of the sample has occurred driving these obser-
vations. In the following, we analyse whether small firms have contributed to this trend 
in particular. After that we analyse whether there are conceivable policy measures to 
mitigate the decline in the share of R&D and innovation performing firms. 
Changing Transition Probabilities and Their Relation to Firm Size 
The aggregate figures on innovation expenditures suggest that there is a strong concen-
tration on large firms, implying that the declining trend in innovation and R&D en-
gagement is driven by smaller rather than larger firms. We intend to corroborate this 
view now in setting controlling for confounding factors such as those resulting from 
changes in sector compositions or growth dynamics of particularly innovative firms.  
We start by considering baseline models, in which we analyse whether and how the 
dynamics between the innovation (non-innovating, product or process innovator, prod-
uct and process innovator) and R&D states (non R&D active, occasional R&D, con-
tinuous R&D) are different for firms in differing size groups. The results can be found 
in Table 3.7 
                                                 
7  The coefficients represent hazard rates, indicating how a variable affects the likelihood of any par-
ticular state change as compared to the baseline hazard. For example, the coefficient of 0.5209 for 
the SME (1-499) variable as concerns the entry S1S2 should be interpreted that an SME with 1-499 
employees is 37.91% (=100-52.09) less likely to move from non-R&D-active to occasional R&D 
activities as compared to the baseline of large firms (500+ employees). 
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Table 3: Transitions probabilities as function of firm size 
SME (1-499)
S1S2 0.5209 *** 0.5934 ***
S2S1 0.8952 ** 1.4354 ***
S2S3 0.7519 *** 0.7873 ***
S3S2 2.2793 *** 2.4985 ***
SME (1-50)
S1S2 0.3841 *** 0.5474 ***
S2S1 0.8062 ** 1.8210 ***
S2S3 0.6928 *** 0.7311 ***
S3S2 3.3195 *** 3.7000 ***
SME (50-249)
S1S2 0.5422 *** 0.7444 ***
S2S1 0.8252 ** 1.6027 ***
S2S3 0.9189 0.8492 ***
S3S2 3.1651 *** 3.1299 ***
SME (250-499)
S1S2 0.7184 *** 0.9439
S2S1 0.8906 1.4532 ***
S2S3 1.2001 ** 0.9483
S3S2 2.5214 *** 2.3449 ***
MML (500-1000)
S1S2 0.7457 *** 1.0702
S2S1 0.8407 1.3628 ***
S2S3 1.1266 1.0188
S3S2 1.8689 *** 1.8166 ***
Med. high-tec man.
S1S2 2.1267 *** 1.7893 *** 2.1352 *** 1.7671 ***
S2S1 0.6169 *** 0.5753 *** 0.6244 *** 0.5910 ***
S2S3 1.0505 1.0084 1.0457 0.9957
S3S2 0.4997 *** 0.7066 *** 0.5306 *** 0.7442 ***
Med. low-tech. man.
S1S2 1.3279 *** 1.2451 *** 1.3521 *** 1.2479 ***
S2S1 0.7272 *** 0.9146 *** 0.7375 *** 0.9405 **
S2S3 0.8863 *** 1.0298 0.9022 *** 1.0288
S3S2 0.9723 0.9053 *** 1.0669 0.9580
N 126891 183774 126891 183774
T 13 13 13 13
LR-test 80108.63 *** 10015.46 *** 80792.82 *** 10996.39 ***
Innovation R&D
hazard ratehazard rate hazard ratehazard rate
Innovation R&D
 
What we see is that SMEs are approximately 37% less likely to become occasional 
R&D performers if they had not performed R&D before. However, they appear some-
what less likely (about 10%) to fall back to no R&D activities, if they were occasional 
R&D performers. Thus, on the lower ranks of R&D activities smaller firms appear to 
switch states less often. Given, in any case that the hazard rate for staying non-R&D 
active (0.52) is much smaller than the hazard rate for falling back to no R&D activities 
(0.89), the net dynamics will contribute to a higher likelihood to end up as non-R&D 
performing in the long run. Additionally, they are 25% less likely to develop continuous 
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R&D activities and are 127% more likely to abandon continuous in favour of occasional 
R&D. Comparable results can be found for innovation. SMEs are both with respect to 
state changes from no to product or process and from product or process to product and 
process innovations less likely to move upward and more likely to move downward. 
The hazard rates indicate that also here the effects are quite sizeable in particular with 
respect to risk to falling back from very broad innovation activities (increase of almost 
150% as compared to large firms).  
To probe this result we subdivide SME dummy into the groups 1-49 employees, 50-249 
employees, and 250-499 employees. We also allow an additional dummy for medium to 
medium-large companies (500-999 employees) which are of particular importance to 
the German economy. Basically these findings corroborate the results showing that al-
though the patterns are strongest for the smallest firms and gradually become weaker as 
firm size increases, they do not die out completely for any of the groups. Thus even for 
the group of firms with 500-999 employees we can still determine patterns that hint to 
an increase for risk of falling back to lower and lower chances to move to higher catego-
ries.  
This finding is interesting in itself because it unveils the dynamics that explain a con-
centration of R&D and innovation activities on large firms. However, it does not ex-
plain that this concentration is increasing. For this we have to show those patterns be-
came more pronounced over time. This is done in Table 4, where we allow hazard rates 
for the corresponding to the SME dummy to differ by time period. Following the dis-
tinction pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis-period (see Figure 2), we analyse this using two 
comparisons. In the first, we include a time dummy for the compound crisis and post-
crisis period 2008-2013 and in the second we include a dummy for the post-crisis period 
only. In either case, if the hypothesis is correct that the decline in the share of firms per-
forming innovation and R&D is due to a changing behaviour of SMEs, the interaction 
of the SME variable with these dummies should indicate an excess decrease (values 
smaller 1) in the hazards to move to broader innovation or more continuous R&D and 
an excess increase (values larger 1) in the risk to fall to lower categories. 
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In particular for R&D, this pattern can be clearly found for both time periods and, in 
line with Figure 2 is it particularly strong for the period 2011-2013. Firms are less likely 
to move to higher occasional R&D if they were not R&D active, and they are more 
likely to fall back. They are also significantly less likely to perform R&D continuously. 
A similar, though less pronounced pattern is observable for the compound crisis-post-
crisis period. The only difference is that the likelihood to become move upward to be-
come occasional R&D performer does not significantly differ. 
As concerns innovation, the patterns are in terms of direction of the coefficients rela-
tively stable over time. Firms in both periods experience an increased hazard to fall 
back from to lower categories. This holds both for state changes from product and proc-
ess innovations to product or process innovations as well as from product or process 
innovations to no-innovating. However, there appears to be some tendency that firms in 
both periods became more likely to move from no to product or process innovations 
(though not from product or process to product and process innovations). The net ef-
fects of the dynamics, nonetheless, is negative because the increase in the chance to 
move from no to product or process innovations was much smaller (13.55% in 2008-
2013 and 31.68% in 2012-2013) than the increase in the hazard to fall back to no inno-
vations (28.14% in 2008-2013 and 65.00% in 2011-2013). Thus in either case, that in 
dynamics due in both periods will result in lower shares of firms performing R&D and 
innovation.  
In summary, we there is evidence of a change in behaviour of SMEs towards less 
(broad) innovation and less (continuous) R&D taking place in the observation period.  
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Table 4: Break points in the transition probabilities 
SME (1-499)
S1S2 0.5087 *** 0.5559 *** 0.5252 *** 0.5780 ***
S2S1 0.8254 *** 1.2688 *** 0.8840 *** 1.3649 ***
S2S3 0.7863 *** 0.8190 *** 0.7632 *** 0.7833 ***
S3S2 2.2984 *** 2.3844 *** 2.2793 *** 2.4175 ***
SME (1-499)*Y08-13
S1S2 1.0315 1.1355 ***
S2S1 1.1578 *** 1.2815 ***
S2S3 0.9151 *** 0.9146 ***
S3S2 0.9943 1.1122 ***
SME (1-499)*Y11-13
S1S2 0.8633 *** 1.3168 ***
S2S1 1.1264 *** 1.6500 ***
S2S3 0.8488 *** 1.0090
S3S2 1.0335 *** 1.4561 ***
Med.-high-tec man.
S1S2 2.1224 *** 1.7813 *** 2.1242 *** 1.7887 ***
S2S1 0.6155 *** 0.5735 *** 0.6174 *** 0.5759 ***
S2S3 1.0536 1.0084 1.0511 1.0104
S3S2 0.5001 *** 0.7046 *** 0.5001 *** 0.7083 ***
Med. low-tech. Man.
S1S2 1.3278 *** 1.2436 *** 1.3292 *** 1.2465 ***
S2S1 0.7271 *** 0.9149 *** 0.7292 *** 0.9196 ***
S2S3 0.8894 *** 1.0316 0.8867 *** 1.0331
S3S2 0.9744 0.9074 *** 0.9741 0.9131 ***
N 144891 183774 144891 183774
T 13 13 13 13
LR-test 80158.86 *** 10266.82 *** 80160.09 *** 10389.48 ***
hazard ratehazard rate hazard ratehazard rate
Innovation R&D InnovationR&D
 
Finally, we consider whether there are any angles for policy to mitigate these negative 
trends. We have argued in Section  2 that the subsidiaries for innovation and R&D can 
serve this purpose. We also posited that two major restraining factors financial restric-
tions and a lack of internal competences which could be compensated through innova-
tion cooperation. Because in particular, in program support both lacks can potentially be 
addressed e.g. through cooperation requirements or through additional credit support, 
we treat these variables as potential angles for policy. 
We summarise the results for R&D in Table 5, where we first treat each variable in a 
separate model and then analyse them jointly as a robustness check. The results for sub-
sidies and innovation cooperation are quite consistent. Both increase the likelihood to 
move to occasional R&D (with a 197% increase for cooperation) and they reduce the 
risk to fall back to lower levels (e.g. 67% lower risk to fall back from continuous to oc-
casional R&D for cooperation and 46% for to subsidies). Some effects also emerge for 
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financial strength as measured by a credit rating index. This works, however, also for 
the top end of the R&D activities, while it does not seem to affect the decision to be 
either non R&D-active vs. occasional R&D performer.  
Table 5: Firm characteristics affecting the transition probabilities (R&D) 
SME (1-499)
S1S2 0.5688 *** 0.6591 *** 0.5259 *** 0.6541 ***
S2S1 1.0187 0.8868 * 0.9022 0.9217
S2S3 0.7266 *** 0.7617 *** 0.7645 *** 0.7394 ***
S3S2 2.2790 *** 1.9420 *** 2.1893 *** 1.9030 ***
Subsidies received
S1S2 1.4524 *** 1.1198 ***
S2S1 0.6828 *** 0.7668 ***
S2S3 0.9833 1.0064
S3S2 0.5395 *** 0.6581 ***
Innovation cooperations
S1S2 2.9734 *** 2.7704 ***
S2S1 0.5831 *** 0.7112 ***
S2S3 0.9391 0.8476 ***
S3S2 0.3281 *** 0.4560 ***
Credit rating
S1S2 0.9630 0.8864
S2S1 0.9275 0.8368 **
S2S3 1.1873 ** 1.0709
S3S2 0.7131 *** 0.6486 ***
Med. high-tech. man.
S1S2 1.9238 *** 1.9845 *** 2.1259 *** 1.8894 ***
S2S1 0.6235 *** 0.6494 *** 0.6166 *** 0.6448 ***
S2S3 0.9038 * 0.9977 1.0635 0.9106
S3S2 0.4481 *** 0.4856 *** 0.5091 *** 0.4699 ***
Med. low-tech. man.
S1S2 1.2752 *** 1.2718 *** 1.3243 *** 1.2661 ***
S2S1 0.7114 *** 0.6807 *** 0.7286 *** 0.7032 ***
S2S3 0.7466 *** 0.8126 *** 0.8962 *** 0.7431 ***
S3S2 0.7374 *** 0.8273 *** 0.9885 0.7266 ***
N 100152 109906 125962 98071
T 13 13 13 13
LR test 116006.80 *** 105354.80 *** 81035.66 *** 119480.90 ***
R&D 
harzard rate harzard rate harzard rate harzard rate
R&D R&D R&D
 
If we consider these variables simultaneously, effects are largely corroborated with 
some notable differences. First, the effect of public subsidies is somewhat attenuated, 
though still significant. This is most likely due to the fact that subsidies in Germany put 
great emphasis on cooperative project applications. This means that some of the predic-
tive power of the subsidies actually pertained to the implied increase in cooperative 
propensity. Second, although the cooperation variable largely behaves as before, there 
emerges a somewhat puzzling effect indicating a lower likelihood to move from occa-
sional to continuous R&D. It is unclear whether this resembles something structural as 
concerns cooperation and R&D, or whether this is simply due to multicollinearity be-
26 
tween subsidies and the cooperation variable. Third, in this model the effect of better 
credit ratings seems mainly in reducing the chances of discontinuing R&D at any level 
of activity. In any case, it shows that also financial constraints play a role for the dy-
namics of R&D activities. 
Table 6: Firm characteristics affecting the transition probabilities (innovation) 
SME (1-499)
S1S2 0.6142 *** 0.6712 *** 0.5480 *** 0.6276 ***
S2S1 1.3820 *** 1.2588 *** 1.3285 *** 1.1879 ***
S2S3 0.7774 *** 0.8014 *** 0.8108 *** 0.8165 ***
S3S2 2.5450 *** 2.3027 *** 2.4425 *** 2.2678 ***
Subsidies received
S1S2 1.5535 *** 1.2564 ***
S2S1 0.7171 *** 0.8243 ***
S2S3 1.0292 0.9774
S3S2 0.7736 *** 0.8479 ***
Innovation cooperations
S1S2 2.2914 *** 1.8278 ***
S2S1 0.5005 *** 0.5841 ***
S2S3 1.0872 *** 1.0075
S3S2 0.5776 *** 0.6092 ***
Credit rating
S1S2 1.0736 1.1594 ***
S2S1 0.9207 * 0.9340 *
S2S3 1.0908 1.0448
S3S2 0.7966 ** 0.7539 ***
Med. high-tech. man.
S1S2 1.6240 *** 1.5976 *** 1.8410 *** 1.5711 ***
S2S1 0.6560 *** 0.6406 *** 0.5880 *** 0.6975 ***
S2S3 0.9418 0.9857 1.0299 0.9373
S3S2 0.7028 *** 0.7424 *** 0.7212 *** 0.7318 ***
Med. low-tech. man.
S1S2 1.2180 *** 1.2285 *** 1.2729 *** 1.2338 ***
S2S1 0.8974 *** 0.8855 *** 0.9295 *** 0.9141 ***
S2S3 1.0178 1.0291 1.0527 1.0444
S3S2 0.8999 *** 0.8925 *** 0.9157 *** 0.9031 ***
N 145338 157999 149200 116761
T 13 13 13 13
LR-test 61347.99 *** 44937.60 *** 28782.43 *** 77627.45 ***
Innovation 
hazard rate
Innovation Innovation Innovation 
hazard rate hazard rate hazard rate
 
When turning to innovation (Table 6) we observe a roughly consistent measure for all 
three variables. In terms of direction, no differences appear for subsidies, which in-
crease the likelihood to move upward to occasional R&D and reduce the risks of falling 
back to lower categories. Also here cooperation seems to very effective, which addi-
tionally increases the chances to move upward to continuous R&D strategy. Positive 
effects can also be discerned for the credit rating. If considered simultaneously, the re-
27 
sults remain robust. The only effect that disappears is the increase in the likelihood to 
become a simultaneous product and process innovator as implied by collaboration ac-
tivities. 
6 Conclusion 
Persistence is major characteristics of innovation and R&D processes in firms. This can 
result from path-dependent learning, sunk costs, or strategic commitment. However, 
despite the general feature of persistence descriptive accounts of level and distribution 
of innovation expenditures have demonstrated a strong concentration on large firms. 
SMEs seem to have retracted from innovation and R&D to some degree. In this paper 
we took these descriptive phenomena as the starting point and analysed these trends in a 
multivariate Markov Chain modelling approach. Our results indeed confirm the descrip-
tive statistics and show that even after controlling for firm potentially confounding 
changes in the sector composition or innovation-induced growth processes the share of 
non-innovation/R&D-active firms have considerably increased. Likewise, the stationary 
distributions indicate that the share of continuous R&D performers and the share of si-
multaneous product and process innovators decreased by about a third in the study pe-
riod from 2001 to 2013. We also showed that that these trends are rather permanent 
changes than transitory shocks induced by the economic crisis in 2008/09. This is par-
ticularly problematic because persistence in innovation strategies suggests that a firm’s 
decision to move out of innovation and R&D cannot be easily undone. This is because 
of the cumulative nature of innovation processes. In particular, firms discontinuing in-
novation and R&D tend to loose the capabilities associated with these activities. Thus, 
even if the retraction from innovation activities may in short-run save costs, in the 
longer term established market positions will erode, if firms to not continuously im-
prove their products and production processes. While this may be a long and drawn-out 
process, the greatest danger is that firms may not find it easy to restart their innovation 
activities, because they lack the necessary competences (Dosi 1996). Thus there is a 
danger that firms withdrawing from innovation experience their established positions to 
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gradually wither while they are unable to perform renewal processes that could counter-
act these trends. 
Beyond the corroboration of the descriptive findings, we also provided evidence that 
this concentration trend is the result of the retraction of mainly smaller firms. While 
Germany is often hailed for its highly innovative SME sector, this suggests that the 
German innovation system is gradually loosing one of its most important pillars. This 
can in the long-run bear considerable systemic risks not only for smaller firms them-
selves but also for the larger ones. In particular, several authors have highlighted the 
existence of complementarity between small and large firms in innovation (Nooteboom 
1999; Tether 1998; Belderbos et al. 2006; Nooteboom 2009) that often results from a 
greater organizational flexibility and flat hierarchies of smaller firms (Baier et al. 2013). 
In particular, in high-tech sectors large “outsource” parts of their innovation activities to 
innovation alliances with smaller firms experiencing a lower degree of organizational 
rigidity (Ciborra 1991). However, if such innovation active SMEs become increasingly 
scarce, the potentials using the organizational complementarities in innovation vanish.  
A further problem of the concentration is related to the hazard of Germany developing 
and industrial monoculture dominated by a few large firms. More precisely, if only a 
limited number of firms mainly located in some key sectors (automobiles, chemistry, 
and machine construction), there is a risk that the sector composition in Germany will 
shift even more to towards these selected factors. This is because the effect of innova-
tion is one of creating an asymmetry by making some firms more competitive than oth-
ers (Dosi 1988). The more competitive firms will then grow at the expense of other 
firms. On the sector level this will imply a shift of resources to sectors with higher lev-
els of innovativeness (Andries et al. 2015). While the reallocation of resources towards 
more productive uses is certainly desirable, the fact that only a limited number of firms 
are driving this trend, this implies an increasing dependence on few firms and sectors. 
As a consequence the German economy runs a risk of becoming much more vulnerable 
to aggregate technology or demand side shocks that affect firms in a certain sector in a 
similar way. In this respect, the ongoing concentration processes may in the longer term 
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considerably reduce the resilience of the German economy against crises and business 
cycles. 
Thus from a policy perspective, there is therefore a strong need to take measures against 
the concentration of innovation and R&D activities on larger. Our results showed that 
several firm characteristics considerably moderate the decisions to move in or out of 
innovation and R&D. We have found that public subsidies, innovation cooperation, and 
better financial positions tend to be associated with lower risks of falling back to lower 
levels of innovation and R&D engagement while they increase the chances that firms 
increase their innovation and R&D engagement. As concerns public subsidies this em-
phasises the effectiveness of the existing project support in Germany to keep firms 
committed to innovation and R&D activities. Indeed, there is considerable potential to 
increase the state support still, as Germany is among the countries with the lowest 
shares of state-funded enterprise R&D. More specifically, in 2012 this share was 
slightly above 4% in Germany, while it was almost 8% in France and the UK and more 
than 10% in the US. Even Italy, heavily hit by financial crisis, ranked much higher with 
about 7% (Deutsche Telekomstiftung 2014). The beneficial effects of innovation coop-
eration and higher financing capabilities give an indication of the mechanisms through 
which the public innovation and R&D support works. In specific, it is commonly argued 
that project support has at least two beneficial effects. First, it allocates financial re-
sources to firms and therefore increases the internal financing capabilities. It may also 
serve as a signal to external financing institutions and therefore may facilitate the access 
to debt financing or the capital markets. Second, the innovation project support is regu-
larly organised in cooperative projects, which is a further contribution factor to staying 
committed to innovation processes. This may result both from knowledge complemen-
tarities between the partners (Harrigan 1988; Parkhe 1993; Schubert 2015) or from sta-
ble institutionalised frameworks for innovation projects (Rammer et al. 2013). Accord-
ingly, Rammer et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence that up to 40% of the total ef-
fect of public support may be attributable to the fact that these programs require col-
laborative projects.  
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While this underlines the general benefits of subsidizing collaborative innovation pro-
jects, Rammer et al. (2013) also emphasise that selection process in public innovation 
support tends to disadvantage outsiders and newcomers. Accordingly, Peters (2009) 
provide evidence that innovation subsidies tend to become persistent creating funding 
careers. Having received funding in the past tends to causally increase the chances of 
receiving further funding. A concentration of funds on firms with proven track records 
of successful projects may statically be efficient because the expected output is maxi-
mised. At the same time it ostracises firms with little or no funding experience. How-
ever, if the goal is to increase the share of innovators or R&D performers, then such an 
allocation is likely to be problematic, because it does little to support innovation new-
comers. Thus, there is a need to find support schemes that are tailored towards firms 
with little prior innovation and R&D engagement. Rather than the maximizing outputs 
per funding volume in the short run the justification would be to enlarge the base of 
innovation active firms in the economy. Schemes that could contribute to this objective 
could be implemented in several ways. One alternative is to create project support 
schemes that are open only for innovation newcomers. A second alternative are uncon-
ditional tax subsidies for R&D and innovation. Comprehensive empirical evidence from 
different countries and time periods has shown that these tax credits can be effective in 
raising R&D expenditures (Hall 1993; Bloom et al. 2002; Czarnitzki et al. 2011). 
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